T he People's Republic of China ("China") has over the past three decades experienced unprecedented rapid economic growth. In large part, China's success results from an export-oriented economy relying on foreign direct investment (FDI), government subsidies, and low input and labour costs. The downside to this strategy, however, is a reputation as a sweatshop producing low-quality goods without recognising or managing externalities such as product standards and environmental protection. (1) Primarily following a government-interventionist model utilised by the early-industrialising countries of East Asia, the Chinese government has managed and controlled almost every aspect of its economy and social development. Such management and control can be seen in China's policies concerning, inter alia, its currency and exchange rate, FDI, export subsidies, and indigenous innovation policies, and even in its policies concerning the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs). In these and in other sectors and issues China has vigilantly pursued policies that arguably conflict with the rules and norms of international law, including those of the World Trade Organization (WTO). (2) Again, similarly to the early-industrialising countries, China now realises it must innovate in order to maintain its economic growth and developmental path. It is clear that in order to do so, China must advance beyond a low-level producer. (3) In this regard, China has become adept at absorbing foreign technology by learning from multi-national enterprises (MNEs) that have invested in China, building internal capacity, and then utilising the acquired capacity to directly compete with MNEs. At the same time, China has seemingly accepted that it must increase the protection and enforcement of IPRs in order to assist its progress beyond that of a "world factory" and toward a true innovator nation. (4) Accession to the WTO has accelerated the pace of change, with most now considering China's IP laws to generally comply with its commitments under the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Measures on intellectual property rights (TRIPS). Enforcement of these laws, however, remains problematic.
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For instance, it is widely reported that
3. At the same time, and unlike the early-industrialising countries, China has given no indication that it seeks to abandon low-cost, low-technology manufacturing. and apparel, pirated films and books, and fake consumer electronics, aircraft, and car parts for both the local and export market. (6) China also is a largescale infringer of patents, with both industrial giants and technology-related industry appearing to blatantly ignore the patent rights of foreign companies. Legitimate businesses are estimated to suffer annual losses of US$250-750 billion in lost sales as a result of counterfeit and pirated goods, while unsuspecting consumers have suffered great losses -including loss of lifefrom poorly-made imitation products. (7) It is almost impossible to predict the losses suffered from patent infringement. Membership in the WTO has done nothing to curtail the infringements; ironically, liberalised trade policies (including fewer export restrictions and the cessation of the state-trading monopoly on exporting) coupled with the rise of the Internet and e-commerce has led to a dramatic rise in counterfeiting and piracy over the last decade. Indeed, estimates from the Chinese government, United States (US) Congressional Research Service, and others conclude that counterfeits constitute between 15 percent and 20 percent of all Chinese-made products, and that upwards of 90 percent of software in China is pirated. (8) Rather amazingly, 85 percent of all infringing goods seized at EU borders are sent from China (with an additional 2 percent coming from the Hong Kong SAR), with around 90 percent seized for trademark infringement. (9) This article will briefly survey the rapid change in China's approach to IPRs over the past two decades, particularly as it relates to China's accession to the WTO in 2001. While acknowledging the breadth of China's transformative legislative and administrative response to IPRs, the main theme of the article challenges China's commitment to the enforcement of IPRs. In so doing, the article seeks to understand the reasons behind China's apparent failure to adequately enforce IPRs and finds a lack of incentive among provincial leaders as one of the main causes of the failure. An interesting offshoot of this, however, is whether the central government in Beijing has the power to increase enforcement efforts. This article discusses this issue at length before taking a more nuanced view that separates patent infringement from trademark and copyright infringement. Finally, the article concludes that while the problems of IP enforcement in China are significant, they are not insurmountable. That being said, prior to solving the problem, better identification and understanding of the root cause of the problem is necessary.
Intellectual property rights and enforcement in China
With the rise of Chairman Mao and Communism in 1949, notions of private property rights essentially became meaningless. (10) This included IPRs, with the abandonment of existing methods and schemes for rewarding and stimulating creation. (11) A system of limited rewards followed, but even that was called into question as hard-core ideology rejected any material inducement to innovation. (12) The Cultural Revolution dealt a final blow to IPRs and banned all incentives to creation by deeming all such creations national assets. With this, innovative creation virtually ceased in China for several decades.
In 1979, China began to seriously consider IPRs as part of its greater strategy to engage the rest of the world. At the same time, negotiations over the protection of IPRs formed part of -and actually held up finalisation of -the Sino-US Trade Agreement (1979). More specifically, the US viewed IPRs as critical to any agreement with China encompassing science and technology and trade arrangements, and made it clear it would not sign any agreement that did not specifically include IPRs. Having no experience in issues involving IPRs, China was reluctant to include them, and thus began intensively studying IP shortly thereafter.
Fearing China would present the same IP-related problems of a rising Japan, in the mid-1980s the US began pressuring China to adopt a general domestic framework for strengthening IPRs and to sign on to some of the more important international IP treaties, such as the Paris Convention (1985), Madrid Agreement (1989), and the Integrated Circuits Treaty (1989). At the same time, China also established the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) and the Trademark Office and restructured its judicial process for dealing with matters involving IPRs. Under the threat of being designated a "priority foreign country" -that is, a country whose trade policies and/or inadequate IP protection are deemed injurious to US commerce -under Section 301 of the US Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) and thus facing retaliatory US trade sanctions, China committed to the US in a 1989 Memorandum of Understanding to submit a copyright bill to the National People's Congress. (13) The bill became law in 1990.
Shortly after being designated a "priority foreign country" in 1992, China reached a comprehensive agreement on IPRs with the US. (14) As part of the agreement, China strengthened and expanded copyright protection, joined the Berne Convention (1992) and Geneva Convention (1993), (15) provided pharmaceutical protection for chemical and pharmaceutical products, restricted the use of compulsory licences, and committed to protecting trade secrets through forthcoming legislation. China also agreed to adopt effective measures to enforce IPRs in China and at its border. In return, the US re- moved the designation and likely also committed to renewing China's MFN status. It quickly became apparent that China was not wholeheartedly fulfilling its obligations, and the US and China negotiated two additional agreements, one in February 1995 and the second in June 1996. In these agreements, China committed to further strengthening IP enforcement measures (including improving enforcement at the border and additional criminal penalties for violating IPRs under certain conditions), and undertook to reduce counterfeiting/piracy and to open its internal markets to US copyright material (i.e., computer software, sound recordings, and movies). For its part, the US agreed to provide Chinese lawyers and judges with training in IPR. (16) As part of its accession package to the WTO, China undertook further commitments and obligations regarding its protection and enforcement of IPRs. Through a combination of revised laws, (17) implementing and administrative measures, (18) and judicial interpretations, (19) these commitments essentially completely overhauled China's system of protecting and enforcing IPRs in a number of areas, including copyright, trademark, and patent. (20) Many of the revisions were clearly made in direct response to -that is, in order to comply with -the obligations contained in the TRIPS Agreement. (21) In relation to patents, such revisions include the prohibition of "offering for sale," judicial review of patent invalidations, and stricter standards for the issuing of a compulsory licence. (22) For copyright, protection was extended to architectural works, compilations, and databases, (23) the right of communication was added for information networks, public performance rights, and rental rights, and protection for computer software was also added. (24) The revisions also modified China's fair dealing provision in order to comply with obligations sets out in the TRIPS Agreement. (25) The trademark law was also significantly revised in order to meet China's obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. For instance, registerable subject matter was extended so as to include three-dimensional and colour marks, protection for "wellknown" marks protection was brought in line with the international standard, protection for certification marks, collective marks, and geographical indications was granted, the time limit for challenging fraudulently or unfairly acquired marks was removed, and judicial review of all trademark and administrative decisions was added. (26) Revisions relating to the enforcement of IPRs -including allowing for injunctions and criminal liabilitywere also added in order to comply with the TRIPS Agreement.
Other revisions, however, are not directly related to accession to the WTO. It is suggested that these revisions grew organically in response to the domestic market. For instance, revisions to the patent law also included a simplification of the invalidation and revocation process, clarification of the ownership of patent rights between employees and employers, and damages based on appropriate royalties. (27) Similar revisions in relation to copyright include the elimination of preferential treatment to foreigners, certain requirements relating to the assignment of copyright, and even enhanced protection of acrobatic art.
Since 2001, China has continued to update and revise its laws and regulations relating to the protection of IPRs. For instance, the Chinese Patent Law was revised in October 2009 in an attempt to more effectively protect patent rights while at the same time promoting indigenous innovation. Correspondingly, the Judicial Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Adjudicating Patent Infringement Disputes came into effect on 1 January 2010, and Implementing Regulations followed in February 2010. Likewise, the Chinese Copyright Law was revised in April 2010 in two limited ways: first, the express prohibition on copyright protection for prohibited works was removed so as to implement the WTO decision in China-IPRs; and second, formal requirements when taking a security interest over copyright were amended so that the pledgor and the pledgee must register the pledge with the copyright administrative authorities of the State Council. Finally, the Chinese Trademark Law is also in the process of being revised after years of consultation. The latest draft revisions, released in October 2011, intend to strengthen the trademark system in a number of ways, including inter alia extending protection to single colour and sound, amending the registration system (i.e., allowing multiple class applications, online applications, etc.), amending the opposition procedures, and allowing heavier penalties for "repeat offenders."
After four major IP agreements with the US (1989, 1992, 1995, and 1996) , membership in WIPO, the signing and ratification of numerous international IP agreements, and accession to the WTO, the problem is no longer that China does not provide adequate laws for the protection and enforcement of IPRs but rather that China simply does not enforce its laws.
The source of the problem
As mentioned above, China's laws and regulations concerning IPRs are for the most part consistent with its TRIPS obligations. (28) The enforcement of those laws and regulations, however, is lacking. The problem is widespread and encompasses all forms of IPRs. Moreover, the problem is not limited to underground counterfeiting networks, as legitimate businesses regularly engage in IP violations with impunity and often target competitors' senior or knowledgeable employees for the purpose of acquiring trade secrets and proprietary information. (29) Foreign rivals also regularly accuse Chinese companies of blatant patent infringement. It is also well known that most government computers have pirated software installed; even the controversial and ill-fated "Green Dam Youth Escort Internet" filtering software, which the government required installed in all computers sold in China for a short time, included approximately 3,000 lines of code from US-based CYBERsitter and is now subject to a copyright infringement lawsuit in the US. (30) This is not a controversial statement, but the more difficult issue is why enforcement of IPRs in China is largely absent. Here there is substantial disagreement among scholars and onlookers. Even so, there is a certain degree of common ground between the varying positions. For instance, no one doubts the substantial progress the central government has made over the past two decades in the protection and enforcement of IPRs. Importantly, most commentators also point to provincial governments and local protectionism as the main impediment to adequate enforcement. (31) This sentiment is echoed by former Assistant US Trade Representative Joseph A. Massey, who in the context of China's failure to enforce its commitments in the 1992 Agreement with the US stated:
That China would fail to enforce its IPR laws and commitments was foreshadowed almost immediately after the agreement when a senior USTR official visiting Guangdong was told by a senior provincial government leader that "Beijing's agreement" with the US was "mei you guanxi" (irrelevant) in that southern province. So far as Guangdong was concerned, the mountains were high and the emperor in Beijing was far away. It was not surprising, then, that despite the 1992 agreement, US firms' losses to piracy continued to escalate alarmingly… (32) Almost all commentators agree that combating the problem of local protectionism will be difficult. The differences of opinion are on whether the central government has the power to control the provinces and whether it sees it in its interest to do so. Put simply, while some believe the central government is powerless to act (and often repeat the well-known Chinese proverb that "the mountains are high and the emperor is far away" ( shan gao huangdi yuan ), others believe the central government could rein in the provinces and improve enforcement of IPRs throughout the country, and they question the government's commitment to IP enforcement.
Local protectionism seems to be at the heart of large-scale counterfeiting and piracy in China, (33) with both local leaders and the entire community (including the criminal element) benefiting from the infringing activities. (34) In this regard, it has been reported that "leaders of local government bureaucracies are often intimately involved with companies that profit from [counterfeit and] pirated goods," while the community benefits from employment and income distribution both directly in the manufacturing and indirectly though increased access to goods and support for the wider economy. Noted China-law expert Professor Daniel Chow succinctly states:
Many of these wholesale markets are established by local governments, specifically the administration's ministry of commerce… You shut down the trade in counterfeit goods, you shut down the local economy… It is no exaggeration to say that [counterfeiting] supports the entire local economy and legitimate businesses such as restaurants, nightclubs, warehouses, transportation companies, hotels. (35) Massey concurs with Chow's assessment of local leaders in China, stating: "Provincial authorities […] benefit financially or politically from the proceeds of piracy or [simply] turn a blind eye to powerful local interests that do [benefit from piracy]." (36) Given communities' heavy dependence on counterfeiting and piracy as part of their economic development, (37) it is unsurprising that local governments provide only limited resources to IP enforcement activities.
Professor Chow is one of the main proponents of the view that China could and should do more to control counterfeiting and piracy. In this opinion, the central government has both the power and ability to rein in the provinces and implement stronger IP enforcement initiatives. In this regard, Chow shares an opinion with Eric Smith, president of International Intellectual Property Alliance, who argues that political will rather than other administrative or legal impediments most severely hampers IP enforcement efforts. (38) Both Chow and Smith thus argue that IP enforcement could be improved through the concerted effort of the central government. To substantiate this claim, Smith points to the government's successful effort to curtail pornography, (39) while Chow's example of the crackdown on counterfeit Beijing Olympic 2008 merchandise is less persuasive. (40) Proponents of this position also point to the labyrinth of administrative processes and proceedings needed to enforce IPRs, the difficulty of persuading authorities to begin a criminal investigation, and the unequal level of judicial enforcement of IPRs (with Chinese companies seemingly receiving adequate remedies for violations of their IPRs (41) while foreign firms struggle to find favour with the courts). (42) Correspondingly, it is widely believed that even when infringers are successfully identified and authorities are convinced to act, the Chinese system does not impose penalties strong enough to serve as a deterrent. (43) According to statistics compiled by the Chinese State Administration of Industry and Commerce, only 45 of the 22,001 cases registered in 2000 were referred to the Public Security Bureau for criminal prosecution. Those convicted faced average fines of $794, and the average compensation awarded by administrative authorities to a brand owner was about $19. (44) With such low rates of prosecution and negligible punishments it is no exaggeration to say that large-scale counterfeiters view occasional IP enforcement as merely a "cost of doing business." (45) The position that the Chinese government is a capable but unwilling power is shared by several others, including Ralph Oman, the former Register of Copyrights, and James Shinn, political commentator and Lecturer at Princeton's School of Engineering and Applied Science. In this regard, Oman states that China "could end piracy with a telephone call. All that is needed is the political willpower," (46) while Shinn adds: "It is laughable to hear excuses from Beijing that they can't control the 50 pirate CD factories. If they were turning out thousands of copies of the BBC documentary on the Tiananmen Square protest -rather than bootleg copies of 'The Lion King' -the factory managers would be sharing a cell with other dissidents in a heartbeat." (47) Other commentators, most notably Peter K. Yu (Drake University, Law) and Andrew Mertha (Cornell University, Government), (48) counter by pointing out the substantial progress the central government has made over the past two decades and the difficulties the central government faces in convincing its 31 provinces to steadfastly enforce IP protection. (49) Proponents of this view argue that the enforcement problem in China is not limited to foreign IPRs. Trademarks of Chinese companies are regularly counterfeited, and locally produced music and movies are veraciously pirated in both digital and physical form. Countering Chow's premature example of China's successful efforts to protect Beijing Olympics merchandise, these commentators often point to the seemingly ubiquitous presence of counterfeit merchandise both prior to and after the Olympic Games in 2008 as evidence of the central government's inability to control the problem. In this regard, Yu states: "If one could draw any lesson from the protection of Olympic symbols in China, it is how serious and entrenched the piracy and counterfeiting problems are in the country… Due to the country's rapid decentralization, the central government does not have the ability to fully protect the Olympic symbols throughout the country." (50) Yu and Mertha share similar beliefs that China's size, heterogeneity, and historical complexities all play a role in the local attitudes and difficulties in addressing the problem. More specifically, both scholars point to the multifaceted and layered levels of bureaucracy related to the protection and enforcement of IPRs at the central, provincial, and local level as a reason for the inefficient and maze-like system, the considerable differences in economic development among and between the different cities and provinces as a structural administrative problem perpetuating low levels of enforcement, and a lack of deterrents, local protectionism, and significant conflicts of interests. (51) Yu also takes a radical approach to the issue in arguing that the failure to resolve piracy and counterfeiting problems in China can be "partly attributed to the lack of political will on the part of U.S. policymakers and the American public to put intellectual property protection at the very top of the USChina agenda." (52) Thus, Yu believes, "It is not only the Chinese who lack political will, as many critics have claimed, but the Americans as well." (53) In support of his position, Yu points to the fact that the US does not prioritise IPRs in its negotiations with China (instead focusing on currency manipulation and nuclear proliferation), its lack of will to strengthen the Chinese central government, and American interest in promoting censured material. (54) Yu further (and correctly) points out that counterfeiting and piracy are also major problems in major US cities, where counterfeit CDs, DVDs, clothes, and apparel are readily available through street vendors, and that online piracy is rampant throughout the US.
Thus, scholars and commentators share a number of similar sentiments in regards to China and the protection and enforcement of IPRs. Almost all scholars and commentators believe protection and enforcement efforts are hampered by a number of factors, including vaguely worded laws and regulations allowing for multiple interpretations, lack of effective deterrents against infringers, lack of political will from the central, provincial, and local governments, and industry reluctance to confront the central government or provincial authorities for fear of losing their positioning. It is also a shared belief that both a lack of resources and poor coordination among various enforcement agencies impedes the protection and enforcement of IPRs. The main point of contention is whether the central government can control the local protectionism that shelters, shields, and fosters counterfeiting and piracy.
Quite surprisingly, few commentators have attempted to differentiate between forms of IPRs when analysing the issues. This lack of differentiation is a major omission, as the issues relating to some IPRs do not apply to others. For instance, while the debate regarding the power of the central government to curtail local protectionism is entirely relevant to copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting, it is questionable whether it can be transplanted to large-scale patent infringement. In some ways, China has moved beyond relying on piracy and counterfeiting, and it is clear that many people in the government do not condone China's role as the world's factory for fakes. On the other hand, in terms of patent infringement of foreign technology it seems clear that Chinese companies are engaging in such behaviour with relative impunity, if not encouragement. Such behaviour can be seen in almost every large infrastructure project (where foreign companies initially supply the technology before losing all future tenders to local rivals) to the manufacturing of alternative energy devices (such as wind turbines), to automobile performance and design. Attempts to enforce IPRs in this regard are often met with resistance, and judicial proceedings and monetary awards are often frustrating and disappointing. One can only speculate why this is so, but some suggest that widespread industrial patent infringement is part of China's economic development strategy in that it allows domestic industry to "catch up" with foreign competition quicker and in a more cost-effective manner. Thus, when discussing IPRs in China a more nuanced view taking into account the various forms of IPRs is preferred to simply discussing IPRs as a whole.
Concluding analysis
Despite over 30 years of continually strengthening the protection of IPRs, China remains the hub of counterfeiting and piracy. This article outlined several reasons for the lax enforcement of IPRs and raised the question of whether the central government has the power to enforce IPRs in the provinces. Whatever the answer, it is clear that persistent pressure from the international community is not the way to convince China to increase its enforcement efforts. (55) China must on its own draw the conclusion that the economic and social benefit of allowing large-scale counterfeiting in the provinces is outweighed by, inter alia, its international obligations or the infusion of central tax revenues if consumers increased purchases of legitimate goods.
Regardless, China cannot escape the fact that the enforcement of IPRs depends on "the extent to which Beijing can compel Guangdong and the other provinces to accept that Beijing's laws are not 'irrelevant' but are the law of the land that must be enforced. The provincial and local committees cannot become 'Potemkin villages' mouthing lip service for IPR as piracy continues unabated." (56) Thus, if the central government is serious about enforcing IPRs, it must gain the cooperation of the provincial authorities and administrative agencies through central power, coercion, or inducement.
This does not mean that industry should sit idly by waiting for the central government to act; instead, industry must take a measured but serious approach to increasing enforcement of its IPRs. In this regard, industry would be wise to study Mertha's assessment of the three most important yet least understood aspects of the enforcement of IPRs in China, namely the nature and politics behind criminal enforcement; the complex relationship among and between the various administrative enforcement bureaucracies; and the economics behind the industry. (57) In terms of the nature and politics behind criminal enforcement, Mertha concludes that in the short-to-medium term, China's legal infrastructure does not have the capacity or the power to effectively handle the volume of infringements of IPRs. In large part, this is due to local protectionism -courts are under the influence of local governments, which in turn either indirectly or directly have an interest in the infringing activities. Intellectual property infringing is a big business employing large numbers of people and supporting additional businesses (such as suppliers, restaurants, transportation, etc.). Thus, it is safe to assume that the counterfeit culture will not shift on its own and that the legal infrastructure will suddenly begin taking infringement of IPRs more seriously.
This leads to the second identified aspect, the web of complex and administrative enforcement bureaucracies. In Mertha's view, understanding these agencies is critical to enforcing IPRs in China. In this regard, it is also necessary for IP owners and industry to identify the deficiencies and inefficiencies in these institutions and to attempt to find ways to compensate for them or to lobby to change them. Finally, Mertha believes that simply appreciating the economics of IP infringement, as opposed to understanding the legal or cultural aspects of, say, counterfeiting, is one of the most important aspects to counterfeiting. Simply put, most consumers purchase counterfeit or pirated goods because they are cheaper than their legitimate counterparts. For the most part, these consumers do not care if the product infringes an IPR. Given this reality, alternative sales and marketing strategies will not end counterfeiting and piracy, but unlike enforcement and court action, this recognises that business as usual is no longer and will never again be the appropriate strategy for operating in China.
There is also a role to play for innovative Chinese companies, some of which have or soon will recognise that the enforcement of IPRs serves their interests as well as those of their foreign rivals. As Chinese companies further develop their own technologies and seek to protect and enforce their IPRs by looking to "Beijing," provincial authorities, and the courts, the pressure will increase on all levels of governmental, bureaucratic, and judicial authorities to adequately enforce IPRs.
China's problems with IP enforcement are not insurmountable. But it is only through better identification and understanding of the root cause of the problem that a solution can be tailored. As this article indicates, this solution will require political will and action on the part of the central, provincial, and local governments as well as determination, fortitude, patience, and persistence on the part of foreign and local industries. Until that time, counterfeiters and pirates will remain an industrial and lobbying force. 
